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We investigate the relationship between the dispersion of executive pay and bank performance/valuation by 
examining two competing theories, the tournament theory (hierarchical wage structure) and the equity 
fairness theory (compressed wage structure).  The key variable of executive pay dispersion is measured 
using a hand-collected dataset composed of 63 banks from OECD countries and 29 banks from developing 
countries.  The dataset covers the period 2004 to 2012.  By combining and modifying a translog profit 
function and a pay-dispersion model, we are able to address the potential problems of relying on reduced-
form estimation.  In our subsample of developed and civil law countries, where bank performance is 
measured by either Tobin’s Q or by the price-to-book ratio, the overall impact of executive pay dispersion is 
mostly negative, and we find supporting evidence for the equity fairness theory, except for very high levels 
of dispersion.  There is a non-linear effect, as banks perform best when there is either very low or very high 
executive pay dispersion.  For developing country sample banks, greater executive pay dispersion has a 
negative impact on bank profit.  In our subsample of common law countries, however, we find no evidence 
of a significant impact of executive pay dispersion on bank performance.  We conclude that lower executive 
pay dispersion, a proxy for teamwork, is mostly effective in enhancing bank performance in a significant 
section of sample banks, i.e., civil law and developing countries.  
 
Keywords: equity fairness theory; tournament theory; pay dispersion; executive compensation; banking; 
translog profit function 
JEL codes: G20, G21, G28, G34, J33, M52         
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1. Introduction 
Executive compensation in banks has been severely criticized in the aftermath of the bail-out of the financial 
services industry during the global financial crisis.  Marshall (2009) notes that performance-related 
executive pay may have incentivized excessive risk-taking and short-term thinking.  In this paper, we 
investigate the relationship between the dispersion of executive pay and bank performance by examining 
two theories, the tournament theory (a hierarchical wage structure) and the equity fairness theory 
(compressed wage structure).  The need for such research has gained in importance and urgency recently as 
compensation issues have figured quite prominently in broader discussions concerning the relationship 
between effective corporate governance and bank performance.  Moreover, policymakers care about the 
design of executive pay at banks because the systemic importance of banks and the use of taxpayer money to 
rescue failing institutions distinguish them from non-financial corporations.  
 
There has been a long-standing debate in the executive compensation literature as to whether higher or lower 
pay dispersion can enhance organizational performance.  In sports, previous studies have gathered 
supporting evidence for the tournament theory and suggest that golfers’ performance improves as prize 
differentials increase.  For professional racing drivers, pay dispersion also has a positive impact on both 
individual performance and driver safety.  Mikovich and Newman (1999) compare a corporate setting where 
individual performance matters most with a golf tournament.  Greater pay dispersion is believed to improve 
organizational outcomes in such situations.  However, the issue of pay dispersion has not received much 
attention in the banking literature.  Conversely, a baseball game relies on individual effort as well as 
cooperation among team members and is said to benefit from greater equity in pay.  In this study, we 
examine whether the banking industry is more like a round of golf or a baseball game in terms of the impact 
of executive pay dispersion.  In particular, we look at pay dispersion at the top executive level and test 
whether the tournament theory (favoring greater pay dispersion) or the equity fairness theory (arguing for 
smaller pay dispersion) is applicable to bank performance. 
 
This debate has been relatively little informed by detailed empirical research on financial firms, and 
comparative studies across countries are also relatively rare.  Most of the previous studies exclude financial 
service companies because financial institutions have different characteristics from other industries.  In 
addition, scholars commonly used reduced-form models by including two or three more factors as control 
variables in their main equations for controlling the firm differences in the human capital of the workforce, 
the industry, and the firm size.  Because the control variables used in these reduced-form models can be 
somewhat arbitrary, our paper addresses the potential problems of relying on reduced-form estimation.   
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We develop an operational measure of how hierarchical or compressed the wage structure is within the top 
executive level and examine its relationship with bank performance.  Our dataset ranges from 2004 to 2012 
and includes 92 sample banks across 18 developed countries in the OECD and two developing countries, 
China and India.  We control for the impact from different bank regulatory systems, capital adequacy, and 
corporate governance variables, while we investigate the relationship between pay dispersion and bank 
profit.  To overcome the limitations of relying on a reduced-form model, our proposed model is based on the 
combination of a pay-dispersion model and a modified translog profit function applied to the banking 
industry.  Thus, our model offers a more solid theoretical background than the reduced-form model.       
 
Furthermore, we study whether differences among countries that are proxied by the level of capital market 
development and legal system influence the relationship of pay disparity and bank performance.  For that 
purpose, we classify our sample banks into the following five groups: (a) global (comprising all banks), (b) 
developing country banks (c), developed country banks (d), civil law country banks, and (e) common law 
country banks.  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior related 
research.  Section 3 describes our theoretical model, while Section 4 presents our empirical results and 
reports on our various robustness tests.  Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2.  Literature Review  
Prior research on compensation and performance first investigated chief executive pay, then expanded the 
scope to the compensation of the entire managerial team.  For example, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) 
suggest that pay-performance sensitivity increases with the span of authority.  Barron and Waddell (2003) 
find that higher-ranking managers have a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation in pay 
packages than do lower-ranked executives.  Overall, the early literature on executive compensation 
primarily focuses on issues related to the level and structural mix of compensation packages and their 
sensitivity to firm performance (e.g., Kale et al. 2009; Cheung and Corrado 2008; Blackwell et al. 2007; 
Bryan et al. 2000; Aggarwal and Samwick 1999; Murphy 1999; Hall and Liebman 1998; Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987).  However, studies on the impact of executive compensation in the financial and banking 
sector are scarce.  One exception is Becht et al. (2011), who suggest that more shareholder power can lead to 
more risk taking; therefore, equity-based incentives for executives can lead to more risk taking.  In this 
study, we examine tournament and equity fairness as two competing theories of executive compensation for 
a global sample of banks.  
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Tournament theory (Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen 2008; and Kaleet al. 2009) predicts that compensation 
across managers will be more dispersed than under the equity fairness theory. The tournament theory is also 
known as the hierarchical pay hypothesis in the literature.  It was first developed by Lazear and Rosen 
(1981), who contend that compensation spreads are not based on marginal productivity but on relative 
differences between individuals.  In the presence of a tight positive relationship between employee effort 
and output, efficiency can be secured by the widening of pay dispersion across the corporate hierarchy 
toward top positions. Good examples of the applicability of the tournament theory can be found in 
professional sports.   
 
The theory of equity fairness (Wade et al. 2006) indicates that large pay dispersion can increase envy and 
dysfunctional behavior among team members.  This may give rise to negative effects of pay disparity on 
firm performance.  The equity fairness theory is similar to the wage compression hypothesis.  According to 
Lazear (1989), wage dispersion affects not only the final team output but also the way this output is 
produced.  Members of high-inequality teams behave less cooperatively and act more selfishly than 
members of teams with a compressed wage structure.  Although the issue of pay dispersion across 
managerial team members has received conceptual attention, the empirical results generated from previous 
studies vary considerably.   
 
2.1 Tests of the tournament theory 
The important principle of the design of corporate tournaments is that greater pay dispersion can motivate 
managers to expend greater efforts that increase their firm’s performance.  In other words, the compensation 
spread across manager levels could provide extra incentives to participate in the managerial tournament and 
to make considerable efforts to win the top executive job.   Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) obtain 
supporting evidence for the tournament theory in sport settings and indicate that golfers’ performance 
improves as prize differentials increase.  In a similar vein, Becker and Huselid (1992) investigate the 
performance of professional racing drivers and find that pay dispersion has a positive impact on both 
individual performance and driver safety. 
 
The empirical evidence on the tournament theory obtained from the business settings side is rather limited 
and somewhat mixed. Main, O’Reilly and Wade (1993) use survey data for 200 firms from 1980 to 1984 
and report that firm performance is positively related to executive pay dispersion.  Conyon and Murphy 
(2000) examine a sample of 100 large UK firms from 1997 to 1998 and find no evidence that large pay 
dispersion is positively associated with improved firm performance.  O’Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988) also 
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report similar findings for the United States.  However, Lee et al. (2008) examine 1855 listed US companies 
(utility and financial services companies were excluded) for the period 1992-2003 and find that firm 
performance, measured either by Tobin’s Q or by the firm’s stock return, is positively related with the pay 
disparity among top management.  
 
In a similar vein, Heyman (2005) detects evidence in favor of the tournament theory by employing a large 
matched employer-employee data set for Sweden.  By using data for approximately 10,000 managers, his 
empirical results indicate that there is a positive and significant association between managerial pay 
dispersion and profits.  The work of Chen et al. (2011) also suggests that the tournament theory describes the 
pay-performance relationship well in a sample of 432 listed companies in China from 1998 to 2009. 
Moreover, they indicate that the relationship between executive pay dispersion and firm performance is 
weakened by higher government ownership.  In that case, the level of executive remuneration is positively 
related to the level of executives’ political power rather than firm performance.  However, financial services 
companies were excluded in the study.  
 
2.2 Tests of the equity fairness theory 
Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1988 and 1992), and Levine (1991) argue that low 
pay dispersion may have a positive effect on employee efforts and productivity by creating harmonious and 
efficient labor relations, thereby increasing output and productivity.  Levine (1991) develops a model 
showing that lowering pay dispersion can increase employee cohesiveness, which in turn will increase 
productivity.  Lazear (1989) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) provide further insight into the economic 
efficiency associated with low pay dispersion. These studies indicate that if promotion and salaries are based 
on relative rather than individual performance, as proposed by tournament theory, then employees will 
advance not only by performing well but also by seeing to it that their rivals perform poorly.  Consequently, 
high pay dispersion may weaken employees’ incentives to cooperate.  In other words, a firm can encourage 
cooperation by reducing pay dispersion.  Lazear (1989) indicates that low dispersion may reduce efforts but 
simultaneously increase cooperation.  Thus, it may be optimal on productivity grounds to compress the wage 
structure to promote cooperation. 
 
Empirical tests of the equity fairness theory are somewhat supportive.  Cowherd and Levine (1992) report 
that there is a positive relationship associated with product quality and low wage dispersion between low-
level employees and management.  Studying university faculties, Pfeffer and Leangton (1993) suggest that 
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higher wage dispersion leads to lower satisfaction and research productivity among faculty members and a 
decreased likelihood that they would collaborate on research.  Using Australian data, Drago and Garvey 
(1998) find that strong promotion incentives reduce employee cooperation and individual efforts.  
Contradicting the equity fairness theory, Hibbs and Locking (2000) report that compression of wage 
dispersion in Swedish companies depresses output and labor productivity. 
 
2.3 Comparative evidence  
Comparative studies are relatively rarer.  Beaumont and Harris (2003) investigate whether a hierarchical or 
compressed wage structure has a positive impact on organizational performance by employing UK 
manufacturing micro-data in five industrial sectors.  They define wage compression (pay dispersion within 
the whole firm, not just the executive level) as the ratio of non-manual to manual labor costs per employee.  
They find supporting evidence for the wage compression theory in one sector, but not the other four sectors.  
Moreover, their results indicate that two intra-industry characteristics, namely, size and ownership 
differences, weaken the relationship.      
 
3. Model 
Because theory does not provide strong arguments in favor of one or the other theory, the nature of the 
relationship between executive pay dispersion and bank performance remains an empirical question.  This 
study fills the empirical gap by investigating the relationship between pay dispersion at the top executive 
level and bank performance.  Our theoretical model is inspired by the following two studies: (1) a translog 
profit function introduced by Mullineaux (1978), which is used to estimate economies of scale and 
efficiency, and (2) a pay-dispersion model proposed by Franck and Nüesch (2011), which focuses on the 
impact of intra-team pay dispersion on German soccer team productivity.  By modifying these two models, 
we are able to address the potential problems of relying on reduced-form estimation.  
 
3.1 Modeling bank performance   
In previous studies of the pay dispersion-performance relationship, scholars commonly use reduced-form 
models, although the control variables used in these reduced-form models can be somewhat arbitrary.  In our 
opinion, the unique nature of the banking industry, i.e., the combination of labor, interest, and capital to 
produce banking services, is captured more fully by incorporating the characteristics of the translog profit 
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function rather than a reduced form model.  Therefore, most of the bank-specific independent variables we 
adopt in this study are based on the conventional translog profit function.   
 
The theory of the profit function for competitive firms and the relationship of the profit function with the 
Cobb-Douglas production were originally developed by McFadden (1966).  Then, Lau (1969) extended the 
theory to noncompetitive situations.  One of the most widely used flexible functional forms for a profit 
function is the transcendental logarithmic function form because this form is easily adaptable to include 
multiple banking outputs and inputs (Diewert 1973; Yotopoulos and Lau 1973; Mullineaux 1978; Hancock 
1992; Akhavein et al.1997).  These previous studies, which mainly focus on economies of scale and 
efficiency, present a straightforward application of the translog profit function to the commercial banking 
industry.  Overall, the profit function has the following two desirable features: (a) Based on certain 
assumptions, a one-to-one correspondence exists between the set of concave production functions and the 
set of convex profit functions. (b) The level of output is not a variable in the profit function.  This design is 
superior to the bank cost functions, which have had difficulties in defining the output of commercial banks.   
 
A typical full translog profit function (Diewert 1973; Mullineaux 1978) includes the following three key 
factors: (1) outputs (2) inputs and (3) fixed factors.  These three types of key factors must be measured as 
“prices of output variables”, “prices of input variables” and “quantities of the fixed factors”, as in equation 
(1).  To model bank performance as a function of the prices of bank outputs, the prices of inputs, and the 
quantities of fixed factors is a significant and justifiable departure from the common practice of regressing 
bank performance against somewhat arbitrary lists of explanatory variables, including executive pay 
variables.  The translog profit function is based on microeconomic theory; hence, we consider it a structural 
framework.  The translog profit function theory provides a solid background to explain why output prices, 
prices of variable inputs, and quantities of fixed factors can serve as control variables for our model of 
executive pay dispersion and bank performance.   
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 (1) 
where: 
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“ profit ” is defined as total revenue minus the cost of the variable factors of production, 
“ output ” is the m  bank output prices,  
“ input ” is the prices of the n  variable inputs, 
and " fixedfactor ” is the quantities of the fixed factors of production.  
 
Overall, the use of the translog profit function can capture the special features of financial institutions that 
have previously been excluded from most studies of pay dispersion and firm performance.  
  
3.2 Modeling pay dispersion 
Most empirical studies investigating the effect of pay dispersion on firm performance can be divided into 
linear and non-linear models.  The existing literature largely concentrates on linear effects (Cowherd and 
Levine 1992; Heyman 2005; Hibbs and Locking 2000; Pfeffer and Leangton 1993), while Grund and 
Westergaard- Nielsen (2008) and Franck and Nüesch (2011) propose that the relationship between intra-
team wage differentials and team performance is less likely to be linear under the two competing paradigms 
discussed earlier, namely, the tournament and equity fairness theories.   
 
Tournament theory asserts that the intra-team wage structure can be viewed as an incentive design that 
attracts talent and stimulates individual effort.  The theory can be articulated by assuming that the banking 
firm’s total performance tTP is a positive function of pay dispersion x , here measured at the top executive 
level of banks:  
  .rTTP x    (2) 
      
By assuming 0  and  0r  , a positive impact of wage inequality on productivity through the magnitude 
and the slope is posited.     
 
However, under the equity fairness theory, team performance reacts negatively to the increase in wage 
dispersion.  This negative relationship can be shown as 
,tEFTP bx    (3) 
where 0b   and  0t  . 
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The overall effect of executive pay dispersion on banking firm performance would be the sum of these two 
equations, where rax  represents the positive impact proposed by the tournament theory and tbx represents 
the negative impact proposed by the equity fairness theory (Grund and Westergaard- Nielsen 2005; Franck 
and Nüesch 2011): 
 
     T EF
r tTP x TP x TP x x bx         (4) 
 
 
Based on equation (4), the values of , ,  a b r and t  will determine the shape of the function of company 
performance.  A linear relationship only exists if 1r t  . If r t , the function of company performance 
will be U-shaped with a local minimum at  
 1/
/
r t
tb ra

, while with r t , an inverse U-shape will be 
formed.  If non-linearities as modeled here are present in the relationship between pay dispersion and 
performance, it may explain why the results of the previous empirical studies using linear effects vary 
considerably.   
 
These three equations summarize most of the previous empirical findings examining linear effects ( 1r t  ) 
and non-linearity (when r t ) in the relationship between pay dispersion and firm performances.  To allow 
for potential non-linearity in our study, we include a linear term of paydisp  and the quadratic term 
2paydisp  
in our theoretical model.  
 
Some previous studies, for example, Lee et al. (2008), Barron and Waddell (2003), and Hibbs and Locking 
(2000), employ the coefficient of variation (CV) as their indicator of pay dispersion, while other definitions 
of pay dispersion can also be found in the literature.  Heyman (2005) define pay dispersion as the 90-10th 
percentile wage ratio. Chen et al. (2011) collect actual pay for each of the three highest paid executives for 
all disclosing Chinese listed companies between 1999 and 2009 and then measure wage dispersion as 
follows:    1log log  AWD w w  , where 1w is the remuneration of the highest paid executive, and  Aw is the 
average remuneration of the second- and third-highest paid executives.  The Gini coefficient has also been 
used as a measure of pay dispersion (Lehmann and Schulze 2008).  Since Franck and Nüesch (2011) 
indicate that the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation (CV) are strongly correlated, we adopt the 
coefficient of variation (CV) of total compensation as our only indicator of the variable of pay dispersion in 
this study.  The coefficient of variation (CV) is a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability 
distribution and is computed as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.  
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We will provide a detailed explanation how we build a hand-collected database of top five executive pay 
(actual compensation) for our sample banks from 2004-2012 for our 92 sample banks worldwide. We will 
provide a discussion on our collection process in section 4.1.  
3.3 Combined model and variable definitions 
In standard production theory, profits come from the flow of output during the production period.  However, 
banks earn profits on various outputs such as different types of loans and bank services.  In the banking 
literature, the three key input variables commonly adopted in a conventional profit translog function are 
interest costs, labor costs, and capital costs (Mullineaux 1978; Hancock 1992; Akhaveinet al. 1997).  In the 
modern banking industry, these three factors remain the key input variables for banking firms in order to 
produce either traditional banking outputs or innovative banking services.  The quantity of fixed inputs 
cannot be changed during the production period.  For example, the average size of the bank firm and the 
regulatory environment can be viewed as fixed factor variables.   
 
Our main model is in equation (5), which is based on the combination of a pay dispersion model and a 
modified translog profit function applied to the banking industry.   Based on our previous discussion of 
modeling pay dispersion, we include a linear term and the quadratic term of pay dispersion in the model.  In 
addition to our original performance indicator, the variable “Profit”, we investigate two further performance 
measures that relate to the market’s valuation of banks, namely, Tobin’s Q and the price-to-book (P/B) ratio.  
If compensation includes stock options, executives may target market valuations and share prices rather than 
operational performance measures such as profit.  In this model in equation (5), we also control for the 
impact from different bank regulatory systems, capital adequacy, and corporate governance variables, while 
we investigate the relationship between the variable of pay dispersion at the top executive level and these 
indicators of bank performances.  Overall, there are four categories of variables in our major equation: (a) 
banking firms’ performance indicators, (b) banking firms’ inputs, (c) banking firms’ outputs, and (d) control 
variables with regard to the different regulatory systems, capital adequacy, and corporate governance.   
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                                                                                                                                                 (5)                                                                                                                                             
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where the control variables 
jcontrol  are the dummy variables for widely owned and CEO duality, the 
variable of capital adequacy, the variable of default risk, and the dummy for development status.  
 
Bank Performance Indicators 
Undoubtedly, bank profit should be chosen as one of our performance indicators.  However, more than one 
proxy for bank performance was adopted because we also examine whether pay dispersion is reflected in 
how the stock market values banks.  For example, the European Central Bank (2010) notes that among the 
large set of performance measures for banks used by academic and practitioners alike, a distinction can be 
made among traditional, economic, and market-based measures of performance.  Thus, our study adopts 
three indicators of bank performance as follows: profit, Tobin’s Q, and the P/B ratio.  The profit indicator is 
employed as the measure representing operational performance, while Tobin’s Q and the P/B ratio (Lee et 
al. 2009; Claessens 2006; Caprio et al.2004) are adopted as the indicators representing the market valuation 
of our sample banks.  Some prior studies (Lee et al. 2007; Himmelberg et al. 1999) also measure firm 
performance by Tobin’s Q and regress it by executive pay dispersion and a set of control variables.      
 
Banking Firms’ Inputs 
To estimate the prices of banking firms’ inputs, we include interest price and labor price as the two input 
variables, which are also commonly viewed as key inputs in the banking literature on the translog profit 
function and translog cost function (Yu and Luu 2003).   
 
Banking Firms’ Outputs 
We consider that the modern banking industry has more diversified businesses rather than simply operating 
in the traditional banking loan business.  In contrast to previous studies in banking (Berger and Deyoung 
1997), which mainly use loan rates, the variable of our output is defined by us as the total income divided by 
total earning assets.  More precisely, all of the incomes generated by banks (for example, interest income 
and non- interest income) have been included in the data of the variable of our “output”.  A more detailed 
definition of the profit variable is included in Table 1. 
  
Other Control Variables  
1) Corporate governance variables 
In our view, corporate governance structures are likely to affect the association between firm performance 
and pay dispersion (Ding et al. 2010; Zheng 2010). We therefore include the following two variables: 
“controlling ownership” and “CEO duality”. 
 14 
 
i. Controlling ownership 
We classify a bank as having a controlling owner if a shareholder has voting rights that sum to 10% or more; 
otherwise, we classify the bank as widely held.  In previous research, it was argued that 10% voting rights 
are frequently sufficient to exert control (La Porta et al. 2002; and La Porta et al. 1998).  While Caprio et al. 
(2004) use a 20% criterion, they still obtain the same conclusion as those who adopt 10% as their criterion.  
The principal shareholders of banks are themselves frequently financial institutions or corporate entities.  
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) suggest that a marginal improvement in legal protection may have less of an 
impact on bank valuations when there is a controlling shareholder.  We observe in our sub-sample of banks 
from developing countries that banks are not generally widely held. 
ii. CEO duality:  
We would like to include this variable in our major equation for examining whether the combined roles of 
the CEO and board chairman in the same person could weaken the positive association between firm 
performance and pay dispersion.  
 
2) Size 
By following prior studies focused on whether bank size may influence valuations and bank performance 
(Heffernan and Fu 2010; Hamilton et al. 2009; Caprio et al. 2004; Yu and Luu 2003), the size of the bank 
firm has also been adopted as our sole fixed factor in this translog profit function.  The quantity of fixed 
inputs cannot be changed during the production period (one year, in this study).  In this paper, all of the 
sample banks’ sizes have been measured in US dollars.   
 
3) Capital Adequacy   
Tier 1 Capital is included in our model as one of the control variables to control for the impact from 
different regulatory restrictions on banks.  Although most countries have indicated their intention to adopt 
the much more detailed set of recommendations contained in Basel II and III, not all of our sample countries 
adopted the Basel Committee’s original recommendations on capital regulations and official supervision. 
Differences in Tier 1 capital ratios across these sample banks may also be a reflection of differences in 
regulatory restrictions on banks across countries.   
 
4) Legal origins 
Many studies investigate the effects of law and regulations for corporations (Chang et al. 2012; Jameson et 
al. 2000).  To investigate the impact from different regulatory systems, we classify our sub-sample banks 
from developed–OECD countries according to the origin of their legal systems into two groups: “common 
law” vs “civil law”.   
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Legal origins are found to be indicative of the strength of investor protection.  La Porta et al. (1998) and La 
Porta et al. (2002) find that shareholder rights are better protected in common law countries, promoting the 
development of financial markets and thus a market-based system.  Conversely, Levine (1998) argues that 
civil law countries have well-developed banks and that their financial systems are more bank-based.  Hence, 
legal origins can be seen as a proxy for the orientation of the financial system toward banks or markets. 
However, there is no one-to-one correspondence between legal tradition and financial systems.  According 
to Ergungor (2004), legal tradition and prevailing economic conditions jointly determine whether a country 
is bank or market based.  
 
5) VIX index 
In addition to employing the conventional translog profit function and the pay-dispersion model as our 
combined theoretical model, we add the VIX index to our model specification as a macroeconomic variable 
to address market-wide volatility.  The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is quoted in percentage points 
indicating the expected movement in the S&P 500 index over the next 30-day period, which is then 
annualized.  The VIX index is a widely used measure of market risk (Balasubramnian and Cyree 2011), 
showing market expectations of stock market volatility over the next 30-day period.  For example, if the 
VIX is 18, one can infer that the index option markets expect the S&P500 to move up or down 
%20.512/%18   over the next 30-day period.  We include the VIX index in our final module 
specification, equation (5), in order to control the changes in market conditions.  The VIX index data in this 
study were obtained from Bloomberg.    
 
Finally, we summarize our estimation methods for each variable and their definitions in Table 1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
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4. Empirical results 
There has been a long-standing debate in the executive compensation literature as to whether higher or lower 
pay dispersion can enhance organizational performance. Moreover, there do not appear to be any published 
studies on examining these two competing management theories with a cross-country study.  In this article, 
we first relate banks’ performances to the executive pay dispersion by employing a group of cross-country 
sample banks.  We empirically examine this question.  Using a sample of 92 banks across 20 countries from 
2004 to 2012, we aim to look at pay dispersion at the top executive level in order to test whether the 
tournament theory (favoring greater pay dispersion) or the equity fairness theory (arguing for smaller pay 
dispersion) is applicable to bank performance. 
 
In this section, we report and interpret our empirical results. 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Period  
The greatest challenge, and one of the contributions of the paper, is to generate the data of executive pay 
dispersion for each of our sample banks worldwide.  Our original sample banks are chosen from the top 500 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) banks.  Our list of top 500 OECD 
banks is obtained from the Bankscope database and sorted by asset size.  Only some of the sample banks can 
be included in this study, that is, if their relevant executive remuneration data are available from Thomson 
One databases or can be collected from their annual reports.  
   
Next, we need to identify who were the key executive team members for this sample of banks by applying a 
similar coding method as Elkinawy and Stater (2011) and Bertrand and Hallock (2001) and making a 
complete rank-ordering of all of the titles in determining which title is the highest (see Table 2). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
We operate under the premise that the executive’s title with the full company should supersede his/her title 
with a subsidiary or division.  In this process, we estimate and review all managerial team members’ annual 
pay information.  For instance, for Chinese banks, we had to collect the relevant data of managerial team 
members’ annual pay information from their annual reports because none of the relevant executive 
remuneration data were available from Thomson One databases.  Based on the ranking of actual 
compensation, we select the five executives with the highest compensation in a year as the base for 
generating the pay dispersion variable for that sample year.  Finally, based on the annual compensation 
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dataset, we are able to generate the pay dispersion variable for each sample bank in each sample year by 
computing the mean and standard deviation of the compensation of the top three to five executives.  The 
total annual compensation for each managerial team member is the total cash value of all pay components in 
that sample year, including salary, cash bonus, equity options and other compensations.   
 
Through the selection processes mentioned above, our final sample is composed of 63 banks chosen from 
OECD countries and 29 banks from two developing countries: China (13 banks) and India (16 banks).  
Therefore, one contribution of this study is our own database of the key variable of executive pay dispersion.  
The complete list of banks can be found in Appendix A.    
 
For the remainder of this study, we also classify our sub-sample banks from OECD countries into two 
groups: banks from common law countries and banks from civil law countries.  The division of banks into 
these two groups is shown in Appendix B.  In the following table, we summarize the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in the study.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
We compute the mean and standard deviation of the compensation of the top three to five executives in each 
of our sample banks.  Our mean dispersion (coefficient of variation) of management compensation is 
0.3977, with an interquartile range of 0.2839, suggesting a considerably smaller sample cross-sectional 
variability in pay dispersion compared with the previous literature. 
 
4.2 Econometric procedure  
In the banking literature, fixed and/or random effects models are usually employed for panel data.  In this 
study, we analyze our unbalanced panel data by employing the following econometric procedures.  First, we 
examine our data using the likelihood ratio test.  The null hypothesis of the likelihood ratio test is that the 
intercepts are the same for each bank and for each year.  If this null hypothesis is accepted, our data can 
simply be pooled and panel least squares can be employed.   
 
it it it it
y x u v      
Where:  0,1itv N  
0 1 2 n
H u u u    
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If this null is rejected, then it is not valid to impose the restriction that the intercepts are the same across all 
banks.  Consequently, panel least squares cannot be adopted in this case. Rather, a panel approach—the 
fixed effects model or random effects model—must be employed.  Second, we employ the Hausman test to 
decide whether the fixed effects model or random effects model suits our panel data better.  The random 
effects approach has a major drawback in that it is valid only when the composite error term itw  is 
uncorrelated with all of the explanatory variables.  The random effects panel model can be described below: 
 
it it ity x w      
it i itw v    or it t itw v   
 
For the fixed effects model, it is possible to allow for both entity-fixed effects and time-fixed effects within 
the same model.  The random effects could be along either the cross-sectional or period dimensions.  
However, because we have missing data in our dataset, we cannot have time variation and cross-section 
variation at the same time when the random effects model is employed in our study.  The null hypothesis of 
the Hausman test is that both i and itv are independent of all of itx .  If this null hypothesis of the Hausman 
test is accepted, i , itv  and all of the itx are uncorrelated, and therefore, a random effects approach can be 
used.  Otherwise, if the null of the Hausman test is rejected, we would employ the fixed effects model.   
 
For all five groups defined earlier, we repeat the same econometric procedures described above.  All of the 
relevant econometric procedures for each sample group have been summarized in the following tables, 
which report the key empirical results.  Overall, we find that the time-fixed effect model suits most of our 
data better. This finding is consistent with the arguments put forward by Brooks (2008), that the random 
effects model is more appropriate when the sample entities have been randomly selected from the 
population.  Moreover, we adopt the White diagonal, which is robust to heteroskedasticity, as our coefficient 
covariance method (Reed and Ye 2011).  
 
To examine whether the time-fixed effect can capture the variation of macro factors over time in our 
unbalanced panel data, we carry out the following robustness check in this study.  We compare the 
regression results for equation (5) with and without adding the VIX index as a control variable.   This 
robustness check is performed for each sample group.  We find supporting evidence that our time-fixed 
effect can sufficiently capture the variation of macro factors over time, as proxied by the VIX index.   
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4.3 Results 
We examine the association between pay dispersion and bank performances by employing equation (5) 
across the following five groups: (a) worldwide, (b) developing, (c) developed, (d) civil law and (e) common 
law.  The econometric procedures described in the previous section are adopted.  Furthermore, to test 
whether executive pay dispersion may have a (statistically) significant impact on bank performance and to 
determine whether it shapes the relationship with bank performance in a linear or quadratic way, Wald tests 
are carried out on two corresponding estimated coefficients: “the linear term of executive pay dispersion” 
and “the quadratic term of executive pay dispersion”.  The following six tables (from Tables 4 to 9) report 
our empirical results for each of our sub-sample banks.  Finally, to better visualize our key regression 
results, we present Figures 1 through 5, showing the relationship between our two key variables: executive 
pay dispersion and banking firm performance.  The figure is only included if the following two conditions 
are met: (a) the coefficients of executive pay dispersion variables (the linear term and/or the quadratic term) 
are statistically significant, and (b) the regression residuals are normal, indicating our model is well-
specified for this sub-sample.  
First, we pool all of our sample banks together.  The regression result on all sample banks, named 
“worldwide”, is summarized in Table 4.  Although the adjusted  2R  on this regression seems reasonable, 
ranging from 66.26% to 87.18%, we observe that the residuals of these regressions are not normally 
distributed.  The problem of residual distribution indicates that it may not be appropriate to pool all of our 
sample banks.  To solve this problem, we divide our sample into two smaller sub-samples: developing 
(banks in developing countries) and developed (banks in developed countries).  This revision in our sample 
choice is also supported by Table 5, which reports the descriptive statistics of the key variable—executive 
pay dispersion—across our sub-sample groups.  Table 5 shows that the average pay dispersion of 
“developing countries” is 0.2515, which is much smaller than the average pay dispersion of “developed 
countries” at 0.4673.   
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
In the second step, we examine our sub-sample of developing country banks, which is composed of 29 
financial institutions from China and India.  The empirical results for the sub-sample of developing country 
banks are reported in Table 6.  We find that the residual distributions of these regressions are normal for the 
log(profit) indicator only.  Table 6 shows that when log(profit) is adopted as the bank performance indicator, 
the coefficient of the quadratic term of pay dispersion is negative and significant at the 1% level, providing 
supporting evidence of the equity fairness theory for our sample banks in developing countries.  The 
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relationship between the variable of executive pay dispersion and the log(profit) indicator is also depicted in 
Figure 1. Our empirical results can be interpreted as implying that greater pay dispersion has a negative 
impact on bank performance in China and India.   
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
The previous Table 5 shows that the average executive pay dispersion of our sub-sample of developing 
country banks is 0.2515.  Moreover, we observe that total executive compensation in this sub-sample is 
mostly composed by salary and the cash bonus.  We can conclude that the theory of equity fairness can 
explain the impact of executive pay dispersion on bank performance in this group. 
 
Next, we analyze the remaining 63 sample banks from developed countries.  Table 7 shows that the adjusted 
2R  for these regressions ranges from 76.61% to 78.19%.  All of the residual distributions of these 
regressions for the three performance indicators are normal, indicating that our model is well-specified.  For 
this sub-sample, we find that the linear term and the quadratic terms of pay dispersion are statistically 
significant for the two indicators of market valuation: the P/B ratio and the Tobin’s Q ratio.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
The relationship between executive pay dispersion and these two market-related bank performance 
indicators is depicted in Figures 2 and 3.  Both sets of empirical results for Tobin’s Q and the P/B ratio can 
be interpreted as supporting evidence of equity fairness, except for very high pay dispersion (U-shaped 
impact curve).  Although the tournament theory is corroborated for extremely high pay dispersion, our 
previous Table 5 shows that the average of pay dispersion in developed countries is 0.4673, placing it on the 
left-hand side of the U-shaped curve, indicating greater overall validity for the equity fairness theory.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Now, we are curious as to what may be driving this result. Therefore, we separate the developed country 
sub-sample into two smaller groups: a group of civil law countries and a group of common law countries.  
The previous Table 5 shows that the average pay dispersion of the sub-sample of common law countries is 
 21 
 
0.5016, which is slightly higher than the average pay dispersion of the sub-sample of civil law countries at 
0.4274.  The empirical results of the common law group are reported in Table 8 below.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 
Table 8 shows that the adjusted 2R values range from 82.79% to 85.87%, while the residuals for all of the 
regressions are normally distributed as well.  The linear and quadratic terms of pay dispersion have no 
impact on the three bank performance indicators.  Based on these empirical findings, we can conclude that 
for the sample banks in the common law countries, neither the tournament theory nor the equity fairness 
theory is applicable to the relationship between executive pay dispersion and banks’ performance.   
 
Finally, we study banks from the civil law countries.  Table 9 reports that the regression residuals are normal 
for the two indicators of market valuation, the P/B and Tobin’s Q ratios, with the adjusted 2R ranging from 
85.35% to 90.45%.  This may imply that our model is well-specified when the impact of executive pay 
dispersion on bank performance is based on the view of market valuation in this sub-sample of the civil law 
countries.  Moreover, the linear term and the quadratic terms of pay dispersion are statistically significant for 
the two market valuation indicators.    
 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
 
As before, we visualize the relationship between the variable of executive pay dispersion and these two 
indicators of the market valuation in Figures 4 and 5.  The results for the Tobin’s Q and P/B ratios can be 
interpreted as supporting evidence of equity fairness, except for very high pay dispersion (U-shaped impact 
curve).  Regarding civil law countries, very high pay dispersion is beneficial to bank performance.  
However, on average, pay dispersion in civil law countries is 0.4274 (see Table 5) and is on the left-hand 
side of the U-shaped curve.  This lends support to the equity fairness theory for most observed values of pay 
dispersion.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
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Robustness Checks 
 
In this study, we use entity and time-fixed or random effect regression to rule out the impact of potential 
unobservable time-invariant firm-specific and year-specific effects.  Here, we examine whether our time-
fixed effect can also capture the variation of macro factors over time by adding the VIX index to our 
regressions.  This robustness check is tested for all of our sub-samples.  In this section, we show the 
robustness check analyses on the sub-sample of common law banks and the sub-sample of developing banks 
as our two illustrated examples.  
 
We address market-wide volatility by adding the VIX index to the model specification (equation 5) as a 
macro control variable (Balasubramnian and Cyree 2011).  Overall, our empirical results of the likelihood 
ratio test and the Hausman test indicate that the time-fixed effect model is the preferred method of 
estimation for most of our sub-sample groups in this study.  When the time fixed-effect model is adopted, 
the intercepts of our major equation (5) are allowed to vary over time but are assumed to be the same across 
entities at each given point in time. 
 
it t itit
y x        
 
            Where t is a time-varying intercept that captures all of the variables that affect ity  and that vary 
over time but are constant cross-sectionally.   
 
We find that the problem of a near singular matrix arises as soon as the VIX index is added as an additional 
variable to our original regression, i.e., the time-fixed effect model would have to be abandoned.  The near 
singular matrix problem may be caused by the nature of the VIX index data because all 92 banks worldwide 
have nine identical annual values from 2004 to 2009.  Therefore, to some degree, the VIX index offers a 
similar function as a time dummy variable.  To examine our assumption, we re-estimate our model 
specification from equation (5), with a simple time dummy for each sample year starting from 1 to 9 for our 
sample period 2004 – 2012.   
 
The sub-sample of common law banks is used as an example.  Table 10 summarizes the three empirical 
results of the common law banks, showing the relationship between the bank performance indicator, namely, 
Tobin’s Q, and executive pay dispersion.   In Table 10, these three regression results are classified as: (1) 
with the time-fixed effect model only, (2) with the VIX index only and (3) with a simple time dummy only.  
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INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
 
Table 10 shows consistent empirical results across the three equations.  The coefficient values of the VIX 
index and the time dummy variable are very similar.   Both variables are also negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  However, the residual of the model specification with the VIX index is not 
normally distributed.    Therefore, for a better specified model, the VIX index should be omitted from our 
major equation, and we should use either the first regression with the time-fixed effect model only or the 
third regression with a simple time dummy only.   
 
With the time-fixed effect model, a slightly higher adjusted 
2R  (85.87%) is obtained compared with that 
based on the regression with the time dummy only (79.12%).  Based on these results, we conclude that the 
time-fixed effect regression is able to capture the variation of macro factors over time, which may be viewed 
as part of potential unobservable year-specific effects.   
    
Another illustrative example is based on our sub-sample of developing country banks.  The regressions for 
this sub-sample with and without the VIX index are shown in Table 11.   The coefficients of the VIX index 
are not statistically significant on these regressions, irrespective of which of the three bank performance 
indicators is adopted.  Moreover, the residuals of the two regressions of the Tobin’s Q and P/B ratios are not 
normally distributed, and their overall fit (measured by the values of adjusted 
2R ) are reduced dramatically.   
 
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
 
Finally, a comparison of these regression results with and without the VIX index for our sub-sample of 
developing country banks, as shown in Table 11, yields further supporting evidence that our time-fixed 
effects have captured the variation of macro factors over time.  Based on these robustness checks, we can 
conclude that our empirical results, shown from Tables 4 to 11, are robust and consistent. 
 
Summary of our regression results across our five groups 
 
The empirical results for all five sub-sample groups are summarized in Table 12.  We find supporting 
evidence of the equity fairness theory in civil law country banks.  In our subsample of civil law countries, 
where bank performance was measured by either the Tobin’s Q ratio or the P/B ratio, the overall impact of 
executive pay dispersion is mostly negative, and there is a non-linear effect because banks would perform 
best when there is either very low or very high executive pay dispersion.  For the developing country sample 
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banks in China and India, the empirical results of the profit indicator also show that greater executive pay 
dispersion has a negative impact on bank profit.  The theory of equity fairness can also explain the impact of 
executive pay dispersion on bank performance in this group. 
 
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE 
 
Other Control Variables  
 
Some of the control variables in our pay dispersion model are also important in determining banks’ 
performance.  Across our five sample groups, the variable of default risk provides a consistently significant 
negative impact on the bank performance indicators.  Another interesting finding is that being “widely 
owned”, which indicates that no shareholder owns more than 10%, yields a positive impact on bank 
performance for our developed country sample banks.  This is consistent with the result obtained by Caprio, 
Laeven and Levine (2004).  They suggest that stronger legal protection of shareholders is related to 
countries having more widely held and better-performing banks.  Conversely, being widely owned has a 
negative impact on bank performance for our sample of developing country banks (China and India).  This 
finding is similar to that of Claessens and Djankov (1999), who investigate a cross-section of Czech firms 
over the period 1992-1997.   In transition economies with more uncertain shareholder protection, a more 
concentrated ownership leads to higher firm profitability and labor productivity.   This may explain why the 
“widely owned” variable has opposite effects on banking firm performance for developing and developed 
country banks in our sample.    
 
CEO duality is another governance variable that we include.  A policy introduced by the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2005 states that the chairman and president roles should not be assumed 
by the same person.  This policy has put an end to the era where the bank president alone took charge of the 
whole bank.  There were a total of 17 listed banks in China, and a total of 16 banks were listed in the 
domestic A-share market at the end of 2012.  However, we found that for our sub-sample of developing 
countries, China and India, the variable of CEO duality has no impact on the three bank performance 
indicators.    
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5. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between executive pay dispersion and bank performance by 
testing two competing theories, the tournament theory (which favors a hierarchical wage structure) and the 
equity fairness theory (supporting a compressed wage structure).  The main contributions of this paper to the 
literature are threefold.  First, unlike most of the pay dispersion literature, which has relied on reduced-form 
models, we propose a structural model that combines two elements: (1) a pay dispersion model and (2) a 
modified translog profit function applied to the banking industry that is commonly used to estimate 
economies of scale and efficiency.  The translog profit function is based on microeconomic theory and 
models bank performance as a function of (1) the prices of bank outputs, (2) the prices of bank inputs and 
(3) the quantities of fixed factors.  This is a significant and justifiable departure from the common practice 
of regressing bank performance against somewhat arbitrary lists of explanatory variables, including 
executive pay variables. We infer that the previously employed reduced-form models in the literature can be 
viewed as one of the special cases of our proposed theoretical model.  The variables featured in a 
conventional translog profit function play an important role as control variables when we investigate the 
relationship between executive pay dispersion and bank performance.  The model we adopt in this study—a 
combination of the pay dispersion model with a translog profit model—give us a very good R^2 of more 
than 80%.  Econometric specification tests, including normality tests of the residuals, indicate that the model 
is well-specified.  
 
Second, most of the management literature has excluded banks from their samples because financial 
institutions have different characteristics from other industries.  However, the need for research into 
compensation in banks has become more visible recently.  Our second main contribution is in creating and 
employing a unique dataset that ranges from 2004 to 2012 and includes estimating relevant pay dispersion 
variables for 92 sample banks across 18 developed countries in the OECD and two developing countries, 
China and India.  Our paper also contributes to the executive pay literature as a comparative study across 
countries; such studies are rare.   
 
Furthermore, we study whether differences between countries that are proxied by the level of capital market 
development and legal system influence the relationship of pay disparity and bank performance.  In our 
subsample of civil law countries, where bank performance was measured by either Tobin’s Q or the P/B 
ratio, the overall impact of executive pay dispersion is mostly negative, and we find supporting evidence of 
the equity fairness theory, except for very high levels of dispersion.  There is a non-linear effect, as banks 
would perform best when there is either very low or very high executive pay dispersion.  However, because 
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the average pay dispersion in civil law countries is on the left-hand side of the U-shaped curve (see Table 5), 
this lends support to the equity fairness theory for most observed values of pay dispersion in civil law 
countries.  This U-shaped effect of executive pay dispersion in this sub-sample is also found in German 
professional soccer teams (Franck and Nuesch 2011), where medium levels of pay dispersion result in the 
weakest team performance.  In our subsample of developed common law countries, however, we find no 
evidence of a significant impact of pay dispersion on bank performance. 
 
For the developing country sample banks in China and India, the empirical results of the profit indicator also 
show that greater executive pay dispersion has a negative impact on bank profit.  The theory of equity 
fairness can also explain the impact of executive pay dispersion on bank performance in this group. 
 
Based on our empirical evidence, we conclude that in developing economies and economies that are 
classified as civil law countries, the costs from envy and dysfunctional behavior associated with larger pay 
dispersion under the theory of equity fairness exceed the tournament incentives and motivational benefits 
from larger pay dispersion under the tournament theory.   Lower pay dispersion, a proxy for teamwork, is 
mostly effective in enhancing bank performance in a significant section of sample banks, i.e., civil law and 
the developing countries China and India.   
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Tables 
Table 1  Definitions of variables in our model and their estimation methods 
Variable Definition 
Pay dispersion indicators   
(paydisp) In this study, we adopt the coefficient of variation (CV) as the indicator of the pay dispersion. 
(paydisp)
2
 The coefficient of variation (CV) squared has also been included. 
Banking firms’ performance indicators   
Total profit 
 
The variable of profit is defined as total revenue minus the cost of the variable factors of 
production. 
Pre-tax profit margin Pre-tax profit margin = [Pretax Income (Losses)]  / (Net Revenue)  
Return on Equity (ROE) ROE = (net income available for common shareholders) / (average total common equity) 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q = (market capitalization + liabilities + preferred equity + minority interest) / (total 
assets) 
P/B ratio P/B ratio = (share price) / (book value per share) 
Output prices 
Output Output = (all income) / (earning assets) 
All the incomes generated by banks have been included in the data of income.  For example: 
interest income and non-interest income.  The definition of our “Output” is as follows: Output = 
[(interest income) + (investment income)]  /  [(marketable securities)+(short term 
securities)+(total loans)+(interbank assets)+(long term investments and long-term receivables)]  
Input prices 
Labor price In this study, we define the factor of labor price as the average wage rate of bank officers. 
Labor input price = (personnel expense ) / (number of employees) 
Interest input price Interest price 
= (Interest expense) / (average interest bearing liabilities) 
Quantities of fixed factors  
Bank size The logarithm of each bank’s total assets 
Control variables 
Corporate governance factors Widely owned 
We define controlling ownership as being present when a shareholder owns more than 10%, 
otherwise the bank is widely owned. 
widely owned = 1,  
otherwise controlling ownership is present, not widely owned = 0 
CEO duality 
In this study, we assume that if CEO and Chairman are different=1, otherwise the same=0. 
Capital adequacy  Tier 1 capital ratio = Tier 1 capital / risk-weighted assets.  
Default risk Default risk = (Non-performing asset) / (total assets) 
Dummy variable for 
development status 
A group for Developed Countries = 1 
A group for Developing Countries =0 
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VIX index The Chicago Board Option Exchange Volatility Index reflects a market estimate of future volatility. 
 
Table 2  Rank-ordering from High to Low   
 Rank-ordering from High to Low   
1 CEO /Chair 
2 Vice Chair 
3 President 
4 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
5 Chief Operating Officer (COO) 
6 Other “Chief” officer  
7 Executive Vice President 
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics of all variables (Currency: US dollar) 
 Abbreviation of 
variable 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
deviation 
Bank asset size  
(measurement unit: million 
US dollars) 
Size 597572.2 290816.7 3649800 4136.773 724035.3 
Pre-tax profit Profit 4718.660 2200.030 48923.34 13.23800 6431.091 
Interest price (%) Interest 4.087504 3.689700 20.33500 0.589900 2.141603 
Default risk (%) Defaultr 1.912710 0.886850 34.82890 0.000000 3.186683 
Output Output 0.048843 0.044700 0.192053 0.007140 0.020660 
Capital adequacy - Tier 1 
capital ratio (%) 
Tier1 9.855876 9.310000 32.00000 -1.470000 3.118807 
Labor price Laborp 0.084283 0.073436 0.504750 0.005875 0.072025 
ROE Roe 11.88407 14.12185 42.32480 -156.5255 14.27658 
Pretax profit margin (%) pretaxmargin 22.11411 28.11740 85.26910 -535.5368 40.55895 
Tobin’s Q Tobinq 1.030052 1.017750 1.619800 0.941800 0.061815 
P/B ratio Pb 1.549660 1.333900 8.127300 0.024800 1.065410 
VIX index VIX 20.80083 18.02333 31.79333 12.55000 7.362375 
Pay dispersion Paydisp 0.397701 0.345394 1.459283 0.000000 0.283854 
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Table 4  Performance regression results – All sample banks (92 banks) 
 
Performance indicators Log(Profit)  Tobin’s Q P/B 
 C -19.3744*** 
(6.5659) 
  
paydisp 0.0320 
(0.4423) 
-0.0522* 
(0.0269) 
-0.6964* 
(0.3873) 
(paydisp)
2
  
0.1141 
(0.3843) 
0.0381* 
(0.0222) 
0.4654 
(0.3101) 
 log(output) -7.0176*** 
(2.3476) 
  
 log(interestp/100)    
 log(laborp)    
 log(size) 2.0472*** 
(0.7675) 
0.1053*** 
(0.0330) 
1.9677** 
(0.7856) 
 0.5*log(output)*log(output)  0.1386*** 
(0.0425) 
1.1912* 
(0.6733) 
0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interestp/100)    
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp)  -0.0204** 
(0.0090) 
-0.2612*** 
(0.0765) 
 0.5*log(size)*log(size)  -0.0080*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1625*** 
(0.0581) 
 log(output)*log(interestp/100) -0.8379** 
(0.4197) 
-0.0585*** 
(0.0190) 
 
 log(output)*log(laborp) -0.8454*** 
(0.3240) 
  
 log(output)*log(size)    
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp)  0.0405*** 
(0.0118) 
0.6876*** 
(0.1917) 
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)    
 log(laborp)*log(size) -0.1809*** 
(0.0561) 
  
 Widelyown 0.2071*** 
(0.0660) 
0.0083* 
(0.0044) 
0.1043* 
(0.0554) 
Ceodual    
Developed -0.5272*** 
(0.1661) 
  
(defaultr/100) -15.8737*** 
(4.3276) 
-0.6554*** 
(0.1252) 
-10.7155*** 
(0.7371) 
(tier1/100)  0.2848** 
(0.1335) 
 
    
*Wald test    
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The null hypothesis assumes that the coefficients of (paydisp) and 
(paydisp)
2
are zero 
Residual residual not normal residual not 
normal 
residual not 
normal 
Our econometric procedures are shown below: 
   
Time fixed effect     
Bank fixed effect     
Fixed (both)     
Likelihood test Period F  
Prob. (0.0002),  
 
Period F  
Prob. (0.0000) 
Period F  
Prob. (0.0000) 
 
Random (period)     
Random (bank)     
Hausman test Prob. (0.0009) Prob. (0.0000) 
 
Prob. (0.0000)  
 
 
Adjusted
2R  0.8718 0.6626 0.6791  
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the performance 
regression in Equation 5. Three performance indicators are used as the dependent variable: log(profit), Tobin’s Q and P/B. The 
sample comprises all banks. None of the three regressions pass the diagnostic checks. 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics of the key variables of executive pay dispersion 
 developing countries developed countries civil law countries common law countries 
Sample banks number 29 banks 63 banks 36 banks 27 banks 
Mean 0.2515 0.4673 0.4274 0.5016 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0083 
Max  1.0062 1.4593 1.4593 1.2391 
Standard deviation 0.2509 0.2723 0.2978 0.2439 
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Table 6  Performance regression results – Developing country banks (29 banks( 
Performance indicators Log(Profit)   Tobin’s Q P/B ratio 
 C    
Paydisp -0.4111 
(0.2815) 
0.1044* 
(0.0606) 
0.5543 
(1.2730) 
(paydisp)
2
 -0.4992* 
(0.2819) 
-0.1085* 
(0.0624) 
-0.5464 
(1.3174) 
 log(output)  1.8665** 
(0.9034) 
32.6431* 
(19.3856) 
 log(interestp/100)    
 log(laborp)    
 log(size) 2.8143*** 
(0.6186) 
  
 0.5*log(output)*log(output)    
 0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interestp/100)    
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp)    
 0.5*log(size)*log(size)   0.4665* 
(0.2589) 
 log(output)*log(interestp/100)    
 log(output)*log(laborp)    
 log(output)*log(size)    
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp)    
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)    
 log(laborp)*log(size) 0.1774*** 
(0.0659) 
  
 
 Widely-owned  -0.0179* 
(0.0097) 
-0.2716* 
(0.1570) 
Ceodual  
 
  
(defaultr/100) -17.3771*** 
(4.7873) 
  
(tier1/100) 3.4764* 
(1.4611) 
 -17.3511* 
(9.1994) 
    
*Wald test 
The null hypothesis assumes that the coefficients of (paydisp) 
and (paydisp)
2
are zero 
   
Residual residual distribution 
is normal 
residual distribution is 
not normal 
residual distribution is 
not normal 
Our econometric procedures are shown below: 
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Time fixed effect    
Bank fixed effect    
Fixed (both)    
Likelihood test Period F  
Prob. (0.0000)  
 
Period F  
Prob. (0.0000)  
 
Period F  
Prob. (0.0000)  
 
Random (period)    
Random (bank)    
Hausman test   Prob. (0.0254), 
Adjusted 2R  0.9956 0.8268 0.8383 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the performance 
regression in Equation 5. Three performance indicators are used as the dependent variable: log(profit), Tobin’s Q and P/B. The 
sample comprises developing country banks. The regression for log(profit) passes the diagnostic checks while the regression two 
regressions for Tobin’s Q and P/B do not. 
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Table 7  Performance regression results– Developed country banks (63 banks) 
Performance indicators Log(Profit)   Tobin’s Q P/B ratio 
 C -48.2512*** 
(11.2501) 
  
Paydisp 0.6176 
(0.9752) 
-0.0690** 
(0.0290) 
-0.9698* 
(0.5291) 
(paydisp)
2
 -0.0261 
(0.7727) 
0.0630*** 
(0.0213) 
0.8760** 
(0.3821) 
 log(output)    
 log(interestp/100)    
 log(laborp) -5.7785* 
(3.2828) 
  
 log(size) 5.6797*** 
(1.2764) 
  
 0.5*log(output)*log(output)    
 0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interestp/100) 1.0571** 
(0.5174) 
  
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp)   1.1717** 
(0.5180) 
 0.5*log(size)*log(size) -0.3030** 
(0.1234) 
 -0.0929* 
(0.0555) 
 log(output)*log(interestp/100) -0.9745* 
(0.5716) 
 
 
 
 log(output)*log(laborp)    
 log(output)*log(size)    
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp)  0.0329** 
(0.0153) 
 
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)    
 log(laborp)*log(size)    
 Widely-owned  0.0131*** 
(0.0044) 
0.2149*** 
(0.0760) 
(defaultr/100) -19.4252*** 
(3.6797) 
-0.7318*** 
(0.1899) 
-11.8308*** 
(2.3645) 
(tier1/100)    
*Wald test 
The null hypothesis assumes that the coefficients of (paydisp) and 
(paydisp)
2
are zero 
   
Residual residual not 
normal 
residual 
normal 
residual 
normal 
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Our econometric procedures are shown below:   
 
Time fixed effect    
Bank fixed effect    
Fixed (both)    
Likelihood test Period F  
Prob. (0.0002)  
 
Period F  
Prob. 
(0.0000) 
 
Period F  
Prob. (0.0000)  
 
Random (period)    
Random (bank; cross section random effects)    
Hausman test Prob. (0.1413) 
 
Prob. 
(0.0000) 
 
Prob. (0.0002) 
 
Adjusted 2R  0.7661 0.7998 0.7819 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the performance 
regression in Equation 5. Three performance indicators are used as the dependent variable: log(profit), Tobin’s Q and P/B. The 
sample comprises 63 developed country banks. The two regressions for Tobin’s Q and P/B pass the diagnostic checks while the 
regression for profit does not. 
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Table 8  Performance regression results– Common law country banks (27 banks)  
Performance indicators Log(Profit) Tobin’s Q P/B ratio 
 C  3.3315* 
(1.6932) 
 
paydisp -1.7485 
(1.9874) 
-0.0764 
(0.0612) 
0.0014 
(1.2696) 
(paydisp)
2
 1.2763 
(1.7695) 
0.0590 
(0.0514) 
-0.0084 
(1.0590) 
 log(output)  2.0460*** 
(0.7208) 
 
 log(interestp/100)  -2.0855*** 
(0.5972) 
 
 log(laborp)  1.2089** 
(0.4971) 
 
 log(size)   7.7824* 
(3.9412) 
 0.5*log(output)*log(output)  -0.1728* 
(0.0950) 
 
 0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interestp/100)    
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp)    
 0.5*log(size)*log(size)   -0.5760** 
(0.2810) 
 log(output)*log(interestp/100) -4.0349** 
(1.4851) 
  
 log(output)*log(laborp)  0.2421* 
(0.1249) 
 
 log(output)*log(size)  -0.1276*** 
(0.0384) 
 
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp)  -0.1976** 
(0.0778) 
 
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)  0.1149*** 
(0.0316) 
 
 log(laborp)*log(size)  -0.0684** 
(0.0261) 
 
 Widely-owned  0.0425*** 
(0.0116) 
 
(defaultr/100) -62.5371*** 
(11.7601) 
-0.4459*** 
(0.0798) 
-9.9962*** 
(1.7676) 
(tier1/100)    
*Wald test    
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The null hypothesis assumes that the coefficients of (paydisp) and 
(paydisp)
2
are zero 
Residual residual 
normal 
residual 
normal 
residual 
normal 
Our econometric procedures are shown below: 
   
Time fixed effect    
Bank fixed effect    
Fixed (both)    
Likelihood test Period F  
Prob. (0.1157) 
Period F  
Prob. (0.0000) 
Period F  
Prob. (0.0000) 
Random (period)    
Random (bank)    
Hausman test    
Adjusted 2R  0.8566 0.8587 0.8279 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the performance 
regression in Equation 5. Three performance indicators are used as the dependent variable: log(profit), Tobin’s Q and P/B. The 
sample comprises 27 common law country banks. None of the three regressions pass the diagnostic checks. 
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Table 9 Performance regression results – Civil law country banks (36 banks)  
Performance indicators Log(Profit) Tobin’s Q P/B ratio 
 C -36.5269** 
(15.5112) 
0.8903* 
(0.5268) 
 
paydisp 0.7663 
(1.2490) 
-0.0851*** 
(0.0194) 
-1.8034*** 
(0.5147) 
(paydisp)
2
 -0.5456 
(0.8979) 
0.0652*** 
(0.0143) 
1.2663*** 
(0.4068) 
 log(output)    
 log(interestp/100)    
 log(laborp)    
 log(size) 4.5645** 
(1.7920) 
  
 0.5*log(output)*log(output)  0.1136** 
(0.0439) 
2.5187* 
(1.2754) 
 0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interestp/100) 2.0830* 
(1.1705) 
0.0413** 
(0.0195) 
 
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp)  0.0356* 
(0.0203) 
1.6115*** 
(0.4644) 
 0.5*log(size)*log(size)  
 
  
 log(output)*log(interestp/100) -2.5777* 
(1.4617) 
-0.0714** 
(0.0274) 
 
 log(output)*log(laborp)    
 log(output)*log(size) 0.5928* 
(0.3024) 
  
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp)    
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)  -0.0097*** 
(0.0032) 
 
 log(laborp)*log(size)  0.0205** 
(0.0090) 
 
 Widely-owned  0.0070* 
(0.0042) 
0.1276* 
(0.0735) 
(defaultr/100) -14.5276*** 
(4.8367) 
-0.6735*** 
(0.1998) 
-6.9496* 
(3.7985) 
(tier1/100) -11.9637** 
(5.9460) 
0.3263*** 
(0.1009) 
 
*Wald test    
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The null hypothesis assumes that the coefficients of (paydisp) and 
(paydisp)
2
are zero 
Rsidual residual not 
normal 
residual 
normal 
residual normal 
Our econometric procedures are shown below: 
   
Time fixed effect    
Bank fixed effect    
Fixed (both)    
Likelihood test Period F  
Prob. (0.0004) 
Period F  
Prob. 
(0.0000) 
Period F  
Prob. (0.0000) 
Random (period)    
Random (bank)    
Hausman test Prob. (0.7082) Prob. (0.0001) Prob. (0.0000) 
Adjusted 2R  0.7108 0.9045 0.8535 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the performance 
regression in Equation 5. Three performance indicators are used as the dependent variable: log(profit), Tobin’s Q and P/B. The 
sample comprises 36 civil law country banks. The two regressions for Tobin’s Q and P/B pass the diagnostic checks while the 
regression for profit does not. 
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Table 10 Performance regression robustness check - Common law country banks (27 banks)  
 (1) Original  
(time-fixed effect model) 
(2) New 
(with VIX index;   
without the time-fixed 
effect model) 
(3) New 
(with a time 
dummy;  
without the time-
fixed effect model) 
Performance indicator Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
 C 3.3315* 
(1.6932) 
 
 
 
 
Paydisp -0.0764 
(0.0612) 
-0.0864 
(0.0603) 
-0.0838 
(0.0813) 
(paydisp)
2
 0.0590 
(0.0514) 
0.0657 
(0.0478) 
0.0804 
(0.0682) 
 log(output) 2.0460*** 
(0.7208) 
2.0225** 
(0.7482) 
1.6808** 
(0.7516) 
 log(interestp/100) -2.0855*** 
(0.5972) 
-2.0673*** 
(0.5523) 
-1.9539*** 
(0.5520) 
 log(laborp) 1.2089** 
(0.4971) 
0.9347* 
(0.5235) 
 
 log(size)    
 0.5*log(output)*log(output) -0.1728* 
(0.0950) 
  
 
0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interest
p/100) 
   
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp)    
 0.5*log(size)*log(size)    
 log(output)*log(interestp/100)   0.0703* 
(0.0412) 
 log(output)*log(laborp) 0.2421* 
(0.1249) 
0.2396* 
(0.1299) 
 
 log(output)*log(size) -0.1276*** 
(0.0384) 
-0.1231*** 
(0.0399) 
-0.1165** 
(0.0428) 
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp) -0.1976** 
(0.0778) 
-0.1877** 
(0.0753) 
-0.1915** 
(0.0756) 
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 log(interestp/100)*log(size) 0.1149*** 
(0.0316) 
0.1127*** 
(0.0295) 
0.1244*** 
(0.0330) 
 log(laborp)*log(size) -0.0684** 
(0.0261) 
-0.0477* 
(0.0249) 
 
 Widely-owned 0.0425*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0436*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0369** 
(0.0172) 
(defaultr/100) -0.4459*** 
(0.0798) 
-0.4322*** 
(0.0843) 
-0.4305*** 
(0.0886) 
(tier1/100)    
VIX Index   -0.0031*** 
(0.0004) 
 
Time Dummy   -0.0090*** 
(0.0030) 
Residual residual normal residual NOT normal residual normal 
Time-fixed effect model    
Adjusted 2R  0.8587 0.8481 0.7912 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the performance 
regression in Equation 5, using Tobin’s Q as the performance indicator. The sample comprises 27 common law country banks. As 
a robustness check, three regressions are estimated: (1) original, (2) with VIX index and (3) with time dummy. The specification 
with the VIX index does not pass all diagnostic tests. 
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Table 11 Performance regression robustness check (with/without VIX) – Developing country banks (23 banks)  
Performance indicators Log(Profit)   Tobin’s Q P/B ratio 
 Without 
VIX  
With VIX Without 
VIX  
With VIX Without 
VIX  
With VIX 
 C    4.6700** 
(1.9675) 
 90.7806** 
(42.9405) 
Paydisp -0.4111 
(0.2815) 
0.1539 
(0.2563) 
0.1044* 
(0.0606) 
0.0007 
(0.0567) 
0.5543 
(1.2730) 
-0.3412 
(1.1401) 
(paydisp)
2
 -0.4992* 
(0.2819) 
-0.2578 
(0.2508) 
-0.1085* 
(0.0624) 
-0.0161 
(0.0583) 
-0.5464 
(1.3174) 
0.2206 
(1.1867) 
 log(output)   1.8665** 
(0.9034) 
3.0195** 
(1.1444) 
32.6431* 
(19.3856) 
60.0815*** 
(22.4014) 
 log(interestp/100)    -2.8624** 
(1.2267) 
 -57.4884** 
(24.5048) 
 log(laborp)    1.0148** 
(0.4194) 
 22.8334** 
(9.3044) 
 log(size) 2.8143*** 
(0.6186) 
2.0506*** 
(0.6956) 
 -0.3491* 
(0.2040) 
 -8.7674* 
(4.7276) 
 0.5*log(output)*log(output)       
 
0.5*log(interestp/100)*log(interestp/100) 
      
 0.5*log(laborp)*log(laborp)    0.0814* 
(0.0469) 
 1.7467* 
(0.9483) 
 0.5*log(size)*log(size)    0.0258** 
(0.0110) 
0.4665* 
(0.2589) 
0.5872** 
(0.2302) 
 log(output)*log(interestp/100)       
 log(output)*log(laborp)    0.3372** 
(0.1456) 
 6.7019** 
(2.7448) 
 log(output)*log(size)      -1.6591* 
(0.8726) 
 log(interestp/100)*log(laborp)    -0.2710* 
(0.1481) 
 -5.3153* 
(2.7893) 
 log(interestp/100)*log(size)    0.1082*** 
(0.0355) 
 2.5137*** 
(0.7381) 
 log(laborp)*log(size) 0.1774*** 
(0.0659) 
  -0.0539** 
(0.0263) 
 
 
-1.2148** 
(0.5682) 
 Widely-owned   -0.0179* 
(0.0097) 
 -0.2716* 
(0.1570) 
 
Ceodual  
 
     
(defaultr/100) -
17.3771*** 
(4.7873) 
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(tier1/100) 3.4764* 
(1.4611) 
3.7412*** 
(1.2257) 
  -17.3511* 
(9.1994) 
-15.6873** 
(7.1180) 
VIX index  2.23E-05 
(0.0036) 
 -0.0019 
(0.0016) 
 -0.0276 
(0.0326) 
Residual residual 
distribution 
is normal 
residual 
distribution 
is normal 
residual 
distribution 
is not 
normal 
residual 
distribution 
is not 
normal 
residual 
distribution 
is not 
normal 
residual 
distribution 
is not 
normal 
Time fixed effect       
Adjusted 2R  0.9956 0.9939 0.8268 0.4697 0.8383 0.4689 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the performance 
regression in Equation 5. Three performance indicators are used as the dependent variable: log(profit), Tobin’s Q and P/B. The 
sample comprises 23 developing country banks. As a robustness check, two regressions are estimated per performance indicator: 
(1) original and (2) with VIX index.  
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Table 12 Summary of empirical results – pay dispersion variable  
Performance indicators Log(Profit)  Tobin’s Q P/B 
developing countries 
(29 banks) 
Equity fairness theory Neither* Neither* 
developed countries 
(63 banks) 
Neither* Equity fairness; except for 
very high pay dispersion (U-
shaped impact curve) 
Equity fairness; except for very 
high pay dispersion (U-shaped 
impact curve) 
civil law  
(36 banks) 
Neither* Equity fairness; except for 
very high pay dispersion (U-
shaped impact curve) 
Equity fairness; except for very 
high pay dispersion (U-shaped 
impact curve) 
common law 
(27 banks) 
Neither Neither Neither 
* Residuals of regression non-normal
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1 - Developing  countries – log(Profit)  
group average = 0.2515
y = -0.4992x2 
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This Figures shows the relationship between the log(profit) performance indicator and the linear and quadratic executive pay 
dispersion variables if the latter are statistically significant in the performance regression in Equation 5. The sample group 
comprises banks in developing countries. The group average for pay dispersion is also reported on the Figure.  
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Fig. 2 – Developed  countries- Tobin’s Q 
group average = 0.4673
0.5476
1.0952
y = 0.063x2 - 0.069x 
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Tobin Q
Pay Dispersion
 
This Figure shows the relationship between Tobin’s Q and the linear and quadratic executive pay dispersion variables if the latter 
are statistically significant in the performance regression in Equation 5. The sample group comprises banks in developed 
countries. The group average for pay dispersion is also reported on the Figure. 
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Fig. 3 – Developed countries - P/B ratio 
group average= 0.4673
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This Figure shows the relationship between P/B and the linear and quadratic executive pay dispersion variables if the latter are 
statistically significant in the performance regression in Equation 5. The sample group comprises banks in developed countries. 
The group average value for pay dispersion is also reported on the Figure.  
 
 53 
 
Fig. 4 – Civil law countries– Tobin’s Q  
group average  = 0.4274
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This Figure shows the relationship between Tobin’s Q and the linear and quadratic executive pay dispersion variables if the latter 
are statistically significant in the performance regression in Equation 5. The sample group comprises banks in civil law countries. 
The group average for pay dispersion is also reported on the Figure. 
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Fig. 5 – Civil law countries - P/B ratio 
group average  = 0.4274
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y = 1.2663x2 - 1.8034x
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
P/B ratio
Pay Dispersion  
This Figure shows the relationship between the P/B ratio and the linear and quadratic executive pay dispersion variables if the 
latter are statistically significant in the performance regression in Equation 5. The sample group comprises banks in civil law 
countries. The group average for pay dispersion is also reported on the Figure. 
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Appendix A. 
Table 13  List of sample banks - 92 banks worldwide  
(1) Banks from OECD countries 
Country Bank 
Belgium Dexia 
 KBC Group-KBC Groep NV/KBC Groupe SA 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks plc 
 Bank of Ireland 
USA Citigroup Inc 
 Fannie Mae-Federal National Mortgage Association 
 Goldman Sachs Group Inc 
 JP Morgan Chase & Co. 
 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 
 Metlife, Inc. 
 Morgan Stanley 
 Wells Fargo & Company 
Spain Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argenaria SA 
 Banco de Sabadell SA 
 Banco Santander SA 
 Bankinter SA 
 Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo CAM 
Portugal Banco BPI SA 
Netherlands Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten NV, BNG 
  ING Groep Nv 
  SNS Reaal NV 
Australia Bank of Western Australia Limited 
 Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
 Macquarie Group Ltd 
 National Australia Bank Limited 
Switzerland Credit Suisse Group AG 
Denmark Danske Bank A/S 
Norway DnB Nor ASA 
Austria Erste Group Bank AG 
 Raiffeisen Bank International AG 
UK Barclays Plc 
 HSBC Holdings Plc 
 Lloyds Banking Group Plc 
 Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) 
 Standard Chartered Plc 
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Sweden Swedbank AB 
Finland OP-Pohjola Group 
Italy Banca Carige SpA 
 Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna 
 Banca Popolare di Milano ScaRL 
 Banca Popolare di Sondrio  
 Credito Emiliano SpA 
 Intesa Sanpaolo 
 Mediobanca SpA 
 UBI Banca 
 UniCredit SpA 
Canada Bank of Nova Scotia (The) -Scotiabank 
 Banque Nationale du Canada-National Bank of Canada 
 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce CIBC 
 Laurentian Bank of Canada 
 Manulife Bank of Canade 
 Royal Bank of Canada RBC 
 Toronto Dominion Bank 
 Bank of Montreal 
Germany Commerzbank AG 
 Deutsche Bank AG 
 Deutsche Postbank AG 
 LBB Holding AG-Landesbank Berlin Holding AG 
France BNP Paribas 
 Credit Agricole S.A. 
 Natixis 
 Societe Generale 
 Credit Industrial et commercial 
(2) Banks from developing countries 
Country Bank 
India Allahabad Bank 
 Andhra Bank 
 Bank of Baroda 
 Bank of India 
 Canara Bank 
 Central Bank of India  
 Corporation Bank Ltd. 
 HDFC Bank Ltd 
 ICICI Bank Limited 
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 Indian Bank 
 Indian Overseas Bank 
 State Bank of India 
 Syndicate Bank 
China Agricultural Bank of China Limited 
 Bank of Beijing Co Ltd 
 Bank of China Limited 
 Bank of Communications Co. Ltd 
 China CITIC Bank Corporation Limited 
 China Construction Bank Corporation 
 China Merchants Bank Co Ltd 
 China Minsheng Banking Corporation (private bank) 
 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (The) - ICBC 
 Industrial Bank Co Ltd 
 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
 Huaxia Bank Co. Ltd. 
 Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd. 
 China Everbright Bank Co. Ltd. 
 Ping An Bank Co. Ltd. (private bank) 
 Bank of Ningbo Co. Ltd. 
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Appendix B. 
 Table 14  “Common law” vs “civil law” countries 
Common Law  There are 27 banks in our sample belong to this category and these banks are from 
o Ireland 
o USA 
o Australia 
o UK 
o Canada 
Civil Law There are 36 banks in our sample belong to this category and these banks are from 
o Belgium 
o Spain 
o Portugal 
o Netherlands 
o Switzerland 
o Denmark 
o Norway 
o Austria 
o Sweden 
o Finland 
o Italy 
o Germany 
o France 
 
 
 
 
